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The performance of empirical money demand equations over the past
decade raises serious questions about money demand predictability. A
variety of specifications were presented to explain past episodes of
apparent money demand instability, but their success in predicting future
money demand is limited in most instances. In particular, the unprecedented
decline in the velocity of Ml during 1982 and 1983 was not captured fully
by any of the previously-modified conventional specifications. This paper
evaluates a variety of the approaches and specifications proposed in
previous money demand studies to explain the behavior of the narrowly
defined money stock from the mid 1970ts through 1983. The empirical
results cast doubt on the appropriateness of the conventional money demand
specification in both the pre- and post- 1974 periods.
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The considerable amount of research devoted to the demand formoney
is justified by its fundamental role in the Federal Reserve's formulation
and implementation of monetary policy, and the potential impact of mone-
tary policy on both economic activity and inflation)' As a whole, how-
ever, the performance of empirical money demand equations over the past
decade raises serious questions about its predictability. A vast major-
ity of the specifications presented to explain past episodes of apparent
money demand instability achieved only limited success in predicting
future money demand.
Empirical research on money demand prior to the mid l970s, culmin-
ating in Goldfeldts (1973) exhaustive study, suggested that the demand
for money exhibited a stable relationship with a small set of macroecono-
mic variables. As noted by Gordon (1984a), however, Goldfeld's empirical
relationships were estimated using data generated from the relatively
tranquil economic period beginning in the early 1950s and ending in the
early l97Os. This period is in sharp contrast to the subsequent period
characterized by supply shocks, high and volatile inflation, and large
and erratic swings in economic activity. The Federal Reserve also began
to formalize the use of the narrowly defined money stock as an intermedi-
ate target of monetary policy in the early l97Os. Moreover, the Federal
Reserve adopted different monetary control procedures in the October 1979—
October 1982 period. Thus, empirical money demand equations from the—2—
pre—1974 period might not be expected to describe the latter period with
the same precision.
The episode of the "missing money" that occurred in the mid l970s
(e.g., Enzler, Johnson, and Paulus 1976 and Goldfeld 1976) In fact indi-
cated that conventional money demand equations systematically overpre—
dicted actual money balances. As noted by Judd and Scadding (1982), this
in turn led to two strands of research on money demand. First, to take
into account the financial Innovation and deregulation since the early
1970's, a number of researchers modified existing money demand specifica—
tions. In particular, money demand equations were selectively modified
to reflect commercial banks' authority to issue savings accounts to state
and municipal governments in November 1974 and to small businesses in
November 1975, the growth of negotiable order of withdrawal (Now) accounts
in New England, accelerated use of cash management practices by businesses
along with more intensive use of overnight repurchase agreements (RPs) and
overnight Caribbean Eurodollar deposits, and the rapid gains in money mar-
ket mutual funds (NMMFs). To capture the effects of these institutional
events, variables such as interest—rate ratchets (e.g., Goldfeld 1976 and
Quick and Paulus 1977), time trends (e.g., Lieberman 1977), brokerage fee
proxies (e.g., Porter and Of fenbacher 1982), and debits (e.g., Enzler,
Johnson, and Paulus 1976 and Goldfeld 1976) have been included as explana-
tory variables. Some studies additionally included dummy and other shift
variables to represent the effects of deregulation and innovation on the
narrowly defined money stock (e.g., Hafer and Rein l982a and Cagan 1983).
Other researchers added various financial instruments such as RI's (Garcia
and Pak 1979, Wenninger and Sivesand 1979, and Tinsley, Garrett, and Friar—3—
1981), Eurodollar deposits (e.g., Simpson and Porter 1980 and Cagan 1983),
and money market mutual funds (e.g., Wenninger, Radecki, and Hammond 1981)
either to the existing definition of narrowly defined money or as a deter—
min.ant of the shift.
Second, the experience during the mid to late l970s led others to
reevaluate conventional money demand specifications. Judd and Scadding
(1981) and Carr and Darby (1981) presented empirical models emphasizing the
role of money supply shocks. Clower and Howitt (1978), Akerlof (1979),
Akerlof and Milbourne (1980), and Santomero and Seater (1981), among others,
presented theoretical models as alternatives to conventional transactions
approaches. In addition, .Laidler (1980), Cooley and LeRoy (1981), Goodfriend
(1983), and Gordon (1984a, 1984b) raised important issues concerning the
econometric properties of estimated money demand equations, casting serious
doubt on the robustness of any past empirical specification.
While many of the above studies presented money demand equations cap-
able of explaining the behavior of the mid to late 1970s, the experience
during the early 1980s has once again raised questions about money demand
predictability. The unprecedented decline in the velocity of Ml during
1982 and 1983 was not captured fully by any of the previously—modified con-
ventional specifications. Moreover, the apparent "nonshiftt' in 1981
:despite the introduction of nationwide NOWs (e.g., Bennett 1982 and Cagan
.1983) was puzzling to many. Studies focusing on the recent period ——includ-
ing those by Judd and McElhattan (1983), Tatom (1983), Cagan (1983), Hamburger
(1983), Hafer (1984), Gordon (1984a), and Simpson (1984) ——havenot reached
a consensus concerning the underlying factors accounting for the behavior of
Ml.—4—
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate a variety of the approaches
and specifications proposed in previous money demand studies to explain
the behavior of the narrowly defined money stock from the mid l970s through
1983. In the process, fundamental econometric issues relating to both pre—
and post—1974 studies as well as issues relating to proposed modifications
to conventional money demand specifications are investigated. In an attempt
to further isolate the sources of the alleged shifts, the sectoral demands
by households and businesses also are examined.
In the first section of this paper, estimation and simulation results
from conventional log—levels specifications are summarized. In the second
section,the conventional partial—adjustment specification is initially
examinedusing first—differenced data from usual sources. It is then fur-
ther tested using alternative data sources for the narrowly defined money
stock and the short—term interest rate to evaluate the consequences of tem-
poral aggregation. Other specifications, including that proposed by
Hamburger (1977), are considered in the third section. In the fourth sec-
tion, estimation and simulation results of sectoral demands for Ml are pre-
sented. The interest elasticity of Ml, an important factor in explanations
of the 1982—83 experience in studies by Brayton, Parr, and Porter (1983),
Cagan (1983), and Hamburger (1983), is examined more closely in the fifth
section. In the final section, the implications of the results presented
here for both the 1982—83 velocity decline and monetary policy are considered.
1.CONVENTIONAL MONEY DEMAND SPECIFICATIONS
In this section, estimation and simulation results of conventional log—
levels money demand specifications are presented. Preceding these results,—5—
the model and data are briefly reviewed. The empirical results presented
in this section provide benchmarks for comparisons in subsequent sections.
A. Specification and Data
The traditional starting point in most money demand studies, and
that taken here, is the Batunol (1952)—Tobin (1956) model of the transac-
tions demand for money. Converting the usual square—root expression into
real magnitudes, substituting real GNP for the volume of transactions, and
taking natural logarithms yields the familiar expression
=÷ Sr+ 2t' (1)
where m is the narrowly defined money stock, Ml, deflated by the price
level; r is the nominal interest rate on the riskless asset; is real
CNP (all in natural logarithms); and 3l and are parameters. The





where b is the real brokerage charge in converting the riskless asset into
money balances.
The conventional transactions model has been relaxed in a number of
ways to reflect other factors not captured because of its inherent simpli-
city. Appealing to portfolio motives, for example, Hamburger (1971, 1983)
included yields on assets such as long—term bonds and equities.' The
inclusion of these variables could alternatively be justified in the stoch-
astic version of the transactions model presented by Buiter and Armstrong
(1978), with the additional ass-tueption of imperfect asset substitutability.—6—
Again based primarily on portfolio motives, B. Friedman (1978) recently
emphasized the possible influence of wealth on money demand.-' Laidler
(1977, 1980) additionally suggested, based on the results of Cagan (1956)
and Goldfeld (1973), among others, that expected inflation is another
direct determinant of money demand apart from its indirect effect through
nominal interest rates. To better represent the own rate of return on
transactions balances, Barro and Santomero (1972) and Klein (1974) also
relax the zero own—yield restriction by constructing and using measures
of the demand deposit rate. Finally, as noted in the introductory section,
a variety of additional variables have been considered in response to the
economic events of the 1970s and early l980s.
Allowing for the possible inclusion of at least some of these addi-
tional factors, and following the usual convention that equation (1) repre-
sents desired money balances, equation (1) may be rewritten as
=+S1'r + +
where m denotes desired real money balances, is a row vector of other
possible explanatory variables, and 8 is a column vector of parameters. To
further permit the possibility of less—than—immediate adjustment to desired
money holdings, the short—run demand for money is typically described by
either the real (e.g., Chow 1966 and Goldfeld 1973) or nominal (e.g.,







where M is nominal Ml; 1nM =m+ is the natural logarithm of the
price level; and S is the partial adjustment parameter. Combining the—7—
nominal adjustment model (5) with desired money holdings (3), the short—
rundemandfor money becomes
=
U(8÷S1.r+ ++ 0t—1+ (6)
The real adjustment model only differs from (6) in that the last term ——
whichapproximately equals the negative of actual inflation ——hasa coef-
ficient equal to zero. However, if actual inflation serves as a proxy for
expected inflation, a term such as maynevertheless appear as a
statistically significant determinant in the real adjustment model.
Despite the widespread adoption of partial adjustment models to specify
money demand, their use has at times been questioned. Feige (1967) claimed
that the partial adjustment specification merely reflects individuals' adap-
tive estimates of permanent income. More recently, Goodfriend (1983)
attacked the theoretical rationale used in applying the partial adjustment
model to money demand and presented an alternative explanation for the sta-
tistical significance of lagged money in money demand regressions. While
the initial results reported here employ the partial adjustment specifica-
tion (6), it is considered in more detail in the next section.
Seasonally—adjusted quarterly data are used to estimate both real and
nominal versions of (6), beginning in l959:Ql and ending in 1983:Q4. With
current definitions of the monetary aggregates, the Federal Reserve's Ml
series starts in 1959. Ml data are initially employed as quarterly averages.
As mentioned previously, real GNP is taken as the transactions variable, and
the price level is represented by the GNP deflator.-1 To represent the
opportunity cost of holding transactions balances, quarterly averages of the
3—month Treasury bill yield and the 6—month commercial paper rate are alter-
natively used, along with the savings deposit rate.' The total value of—8—
equities, as of the end of the quarter, is used as the wealth variable.!'
While this variable excludes important components of wealth, it most likely
reflects a significant portion of the variation in alternative measures of
wealth as well as returns on equities.
B. Estimation and Simulation Results
Estimation results for several permutations of the conventional
log—levels money demand specification are reported in Table 1. Estimation
results are presented for two subsamples. The initial observation in the
first subsample reflects the current starting date of the Ml series, taking
lagged money values and the serial correlation correction procedure into
account. The sample is divided at the end of 1973, prior to the onset of
the alleged missing money episode. The second subsample spans the 1974:Ql—
l983Q4 period.
The usual practice of simply adding subsequent years of data to earl-
ier estimation periods is not followed here. Given the different character-
istics of the post—1974 economy, as noted previously, pooling pre— and post—
1974 data may bias the estimation results for both periods. Moreover, the
Federal Reserve's greater commitment to monetary targeting during the l970s
and particularly the change in monetary control procedures from October 1979
to October 1982 would seem to provide classic examples for the potential
applicability of the Lucas (1976) critique.!1
As is also apparent ittthetable, a serial correlation correction pro-
cedure is used when significant serial correlation is evident. Following
Fackler and MeMillin (1983), the Hildreth—Lu technique is used to avoid
potential problems with the Cochrane—Orcutt procedure.!1 Other researchers
(e.g., Lawnas and Spencer 1980 and Hafer and Rein 1982a, 1982b) have used— 9.—
Hatanaka's (1974) efficient estimator of p with only slight differences
in the estimation results.
Equations (1.1) through (1.4) use the commercial paper rate as the
short—ten market interest rate. In equation (1.1), the wealth variable
is included along with the change in the logarithm of the price level.
Equation (1.2) only differs from (1.1) in that the wealth variable is
deleted. Equations (1.3) and (1.4) are similar to (1.1) and (1.2), respec-
tively, except that the price variable is constrained to conform to the
nominal adjustment model (6). These same four specifications are repeated
in equations (1.5) through (1.8), where the Treasury bill yield replaces
the commercial paper rate. Again, both of these yields are calculated as
quarterly averages. A comparison of the performances of these yields is
included in Table 1 because of the reliance placed on end—of—quarter Trea-
sury bill yield data in subsequent sections, which departs from the tradi-
tional use of the commercial paper rate. The greater availability of end—
of—quarter Treasury bill yield data from public sources dictated this choice.
The results reported for equations (1.1) through (1.8) exhibit several
characteristics. First, when included, the wealth variable is statistically
significant at the 5 percent level with the anticipated sign. Second, the
estimated elasticities of both the commercial paper rate and the Treasury
bill yield are statistically significant, with the former exhibiting slightly
larger absolute values. Other estimated coefficients are relatively
unaffected by the choice of the short—ten interest rate. Third, the esti-
mated coefficient on the price term, in comparison to the coefficient on
lagged real money balances, indicates that the nominal adjustment model can-
not be rejected at low significance levels. Fourth, the serial correlation—10—
correction procedure yields significant estimates of p, perhaps indicating
misspecification. Finally, despite the autocorrelation correction in addi-
tion to the presence of the lagged dependent variable, serial correlation
in the estimated equations persists, especially when wealth is excluded.
These statistical properties could be symptomatic of either problems with
the data (e.g., Goodfriend 1983) or more basic flaws in the specifications.
On the bottom half of Table 1, the same eight specifications are esti-
mated over the l974:Q1 —1983:Q4period. Again, several features of these
results are noteworthy. First, the wealth variable is uniformly insignifi-
cant in this latter period. Second, the estimated elasticity of the short—
term market rate is statistically significant at the 10 percent level in
only the most restrictive specifications, (1.12) and (1.16). Third, the
results suggest that serial correlation correction is not needed. Fourth,
the nominal adjustment model again cannot be rejected at low significance
levels, but the speed of adjustment is implausibly slow. Moreover, the
significantly larger coefficient estimate on lagged money in the 1974:Q1 —
l983:Q4period seems contrary to assertions about greater cash management
and overall economization on transactions balances during this period.
To further examine the properties of conventional log—levels specif 1—
cations, selected equations in Table 1 are simulated over the 1974:Ql —
l983:Q4and l982:Ql —1983:Q4periods. Following Hem (1950), post—sample
I
staticsimulation results are reported. In these simulations, lagged real
money balances equal historical values. This methodology is selected
mainly for diagnostic reasons. In particular, it is much more straight-
forward to distinguish between permanent level, increasing, and transitory
shifts using this approach. Moreover, dynamic simulation errors are merely—11—
combinations of past static simulation errors.
Post—sample static simulation results for the 1974:Ql —1983:Q4period
using equations (1.3) and (1.7) ——thenominal adjustment specification
with alternative market interest rates ——arereported in the first four
columns of Table 2. Simulation errors are reported as both real dollar
amounts and percentages. Both of these money demand equations exhibit the
downward shift usually found in similar specifications starting in 1975 and
continuing throughout the 17970s. In particular, actual real money balances
are on average 1.9 and 1.7 percent below predicted levels for equations
(1.3) and (1.7), respectively, in the period spanning l974:Ql —198l:Q4.
For 1982—83, the simulation results for equations (1.3) and (1.7) continue
to reflect a downward shift in comparison to the pre—1974 period, but the
mean errors of —2.6 and —2.3 percent, respectively, are smaller in absolute
value than those in the preceding two years.!! These results suggest that
concern about the 1982—83 episode may be misdirected. Instead, the relevant
puzzle may concern a temporary downward shift in 1980 and 1981, where mean
errors averaged —3.3 and —3.0 percent for equations (1.3) and (1.7), respec-
tively.
Simulation results for equations (1.11) and (1.15) ——reestimatedover
the l974:Ql —l981:Q4period ——arepresented in the last two rows of the
table. On average, the prediction errors are positive, but they amount to
only $l.6b and $1.7b, respectively, or percentage errors of about 0.7 per-
cent in each case2" Furthermore, the largest error ——occurringin l982:Q4 ——
isonly about 2½ times the within—sample root—mean—square error. The esti-
mated equations which generated these results may, nevertheless, be criti-
cized on the basis of some of their properties. In addition to those—12—
mentionedpreviously, the only statistically significant coefficient in
the nominal—adjustment forecasting equations is on lagged money, and it
is not significantly different from unity.
2.FURTHER EXAMINATIONOF THE PARTIALADJUSTMENT MODEL
Theresultsin the previous section cast doubt on the robustness of
conventional money demand equations. As noted, conventional log—levels
relationships estimated with data ending before 1974 are consistent with
the missing money hypothesis. Using data beginning in 1974, conventional
money demand equations exhibit implausibly slow adjustment to desired
money balances, and potential determinants apart from lagged money are
typically not statistically significant. In this section, the conventional
model is further examined along two lines. Estimation with first—differ—
enced data is initially considered. Then, alternative data sources are
employed to examine the consequences of temporal aggregation.
A. First—Difference Specification
Hafer and Rein (1980), Fackler and McMillin (1983), and Gordon
(l984a) all recommend that the conventional money demand specification
should at least be considered in first—difference f on. Following Granger
and Newbold (1974). this practice is desirable as an informal specifica-
tion test in that the possibility of spurious correlation due to trends
t
isreduced. Plosser and Schwert (1978) recommend this procedure more
strongly. They suggest that if an equation is properly specified, its
estimated coefficients should be robust over alternative orders of differ—
encing. The presence of a lagged dependent variable, however, potentially
complicates the interpretation of estimation results from first—difference—13—
specifications. Plosser, Schwert, and White (1982) devised a specification
test for this case involving instrumental variables, but as Cooley and LeRoy
(1981) noted in a similar context, plausible instruments also are likely to
be correlated with the error term in money demand equations. First—differ—
encing is nevertheless applied below to help eliminate trends and possibly
autocorrelated error terms.
First difference estimates of the equations in Table 1 are presented in
Table 3. For the l959:Q3—1973:Q4 periods the estimation results reported in
equations (3.1) through (3.8) are generally quite similar to those reported
for analogous log—levels specifications. Apart from the lower estimated
Treasury bill yield elasticity in equations (3.5) through (3.8), the only
other noteworthy difference with respect to estimated coefficients is the
more rapid adjustment speed. The first—difference specification also appears
to have eliminated the autocorrelation problems in Table 1.
In contrast to the results from the earlier subsample, the estimation
results obtained after differencing the data in the 1974:Ql—1983;Q4 period
differ substantially from those reported in Table 1. The primary conflict
occurs with the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. This
coefficient declines from a value of about 0.9 to 0.3. Thus, the results in
Table 3 indicate that the speed of adjustment has risen, not declined, in
the post—1974 period. A futher consesuence is that the nominal adjustment
model can be rejected in each case at the 5 percent level of significance. In
other words, actual inflation is estimated to have an independent and statis-
tically significant effect on money demand.
The post—sample properties of selected first difference specifications
are examined in Table 4. The first four columns report the static simulation—14—
errors of equations (3.3) and (3.7) ——whichonly differ by the definition
of the short—term yield ——forthe l974:Q1—l983:Q4 period. In contrast to
the results for the log—levels specifications, these equations exhibit
only slight negative bias through 1981:Q4, and then small positive bias for
the 1982—83 period.111 These equations also yield greatly reduced root—mean—
square errors in comparison to analogous specifications in Table 2. The
simulation results for a money demand equation estimated from 1974:Ql
through 198l:Q4 are reported in the last two coiumns)?" While the predic-
tive performance of this equation is less accurate than the others in the
table, the mean error is nevertheless lower than the within—sample root—
13/ mean—square error..—
As a whole, the relatively accurate simulation results obtained after
differencing suggest that more elaborate specifications may not be needed
in order to predict future money demand. Moreover, estimation results for
the pre—1974 period yielded stable point estimates for levels and first—
difference specifications. However, the plausibility of the estimates may
be questioned, particularly concerning partial adjustment. In addition,
the estimation results for the 1974—83 sample period are neither sensible
nor robust.
B. Consequences of Temporal Aggregation
The data used in the Federal Reserve's policy analysis are con—
1
structedas daily averages over months or quarters. For this reason, along
with the discrete nature of money withdrawals in the Baumol—Tobin model,
temporally aggregated data are used almost exclusively in money demand
studies.' Despite theseemingly widespread acceptance of this practice,
temporal aggregation can lead to biased estimates in many applications (e.g.,—1.5—
Zelinerand Montmarquette 1971). One prominent example was presented by
Working (1960), who demonstrated that data following a random walk, when
averaged, will have correlated first differences. Thus, it is at least
possible that some of the statistical properties of conventional money
demand equations are a consequence of the temporal aggregation of finan-
cial data)
To investigate the effects of temporal aggregation, two additional
sources of Ml data are considered. One is the Ni data taken from the flow
of funds accounts (MFF). These data presumably reflect money balances as
of the last day of the quarter)á' The other source is the Federal
Reserve's weekly Ml series, which corresponds to daily—average money bal-
ances over a given week. These data are currently available from 1975,
and the balances during the last week of the quarter are used here (MW).
To avoid potential aggregation problems with other financial data, the 3—
month Treasury bill yield on the last day of the quarter replaces the pre-
vious averaged yield. Also, as mentioned previously, the wealth variable
is already constructed as an end—of--quarter quantity)hd'
The correlations between alternative Ml data ——bothin terms of levels
and differences ——arereported in Table 5. The flow—of--funds Ml data also
are averaged (AMFF) and compared to other measures. On the top half of the
table, the correlations between traditional Ml, end—of—quarter Ml, and aver-
aged end—of—quarter Ml are calculated for the entire 1959—83 sample period.
The levels corresponding to these different measures are very highly corre-
lated reflecting a strong time trend. The averaged flow—of—funds data also
are highly correlated (0.86) with the traditional data after differencing,
while the end—of—quarter data are less highly correlated with both measures.—16—
Similar results are reported for the 1975—83 period, conforming to the cur-
rent availability of the weekly Ml series. Again, all level measures are
highly correlated, and the averaged flow—of—funds data yield the highest
correlation (0.72) with the traditional data after differencing. As a
whole, the correlations suggest that these alternative measures are broadly
consistent.
Estimation results using end—of—quarter, averaged end—of—quarter and
last—week—in—the—quarter Ml data are reported in Table 6. The 1959:Q3—1973:
Q4 and 1974:Ql—l983:Q4 sample periods are employed as before, as well as
the l975Q3—l983:Q4 sample period to consider the weekly Ml data series.
For each measure of Ml, three specifications are estimated. The first
corresponds to the most general specification in Table 1, including both
wealth and an unrestricted price term. The second applies an autocorrela—
tion correction procedure to the same specification. The lagged dependent
variable is dropped in the third specification to compare the partial
adjustment model with the serial correlation alternative.
With the exception of the interest—rate elasticities, the results for
the pre—1974 sample period using averaged flow—of—funds data ——equations
(6.4) —(6.6)——aresimilar to those reported in Table 1. The differences
are that the estimated Treasury bill yield elasticity is positive and the
savings deposit rate is statistically significant..L&t The nominal adjust—
ment model (b6b7) cannot, however, be rejected, while the real adjustment
model (b7 =0)can be rejected at low significance levels. Moreover, the
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is statistically significant
in equations (6.4) and (6.5), and despite its presence in addition to the
serial correlation correction procedure in (6.5), substantial serial—'7—
correlation remains as in Table 1.
Estimation results using end—of-quarter data in the pre—1974 period
are presented in equations (6.1) through (6.3). Using these data, the
appropriateness of the real versus the nominal partial adjustment model
cannot be determined. Moreover, the partial adjustment framework in gen-
eral may be questioned, as the alternative serial correlation specifica-
tion (6.3) yields a smaller estimated standard error (0.0061) than either
equations (6.1) or (6.2).121 All specifications, however, eliminate the
significant autocorrelation exhibited in Table 1. Also, similar to equa-
tions (6.4) —(6.6),the savings deposit rate has a statistically signif i—
cant coefficient with the anticipated sign, while the Treasury bill yield
is positive and insignificant.
Estimation results for the l974:Q1—1983:Q4 period are reported in
equations (6.7) —(6.12).Using averaged data, equation (6.10) exhibits
the larger coefficient on lagged money found in Table 1, but this coeff i—
cient diminishes in size once the equation is corrected for serial corre—
lation (6.11). In this latter specification, the nominal adjustment model
also can be rejected, in contrast to Table 1. Using end—of—quarter data,
the serial correlation specification (6.9) again gives a lower estimated
standard error than the partial adjustment specification (6.7), and it
also implies that actual inflation influences money demand directly.
In the last six rows of the table, end—of—quarter and last—week—in—
the—quarter data are considered over the 1975:Q3—1983:Q4 sample period.
In contrast to results from the entire post—1974 sample, estimates of the
partial adjustment model using end—of—quarter data (6.13) imply a signif i—
cantly negative Treasury bill yield elasticity. The serial correlation-18—
specification (6.15) also yields a somewhat higher estimated standard
error in this case. Using last-week—in—the—quarter data, the estimated
standard error of the autocorrelation specification (6.18) again is
somewhat higher than that of the partial adjustment alternative (6.16),
and the estimated elasticity of the market rate is statistically signi-
ficant at the 5 percent level in equations (6.16) —(6.17).Because of
the similarities to equations (6.13) —(6.15),the properties of equa-
tions (6.16) —(6.18)appear to be more of a function of the later start-
ing date of the estimation period than different sources of Ml data.
To further examine the properties of the specifications in Table 6,
first difference money demand equations are estimated using alternative
Ml data in Table 7. The same three subsamples as before are considered.
As a whole, the only equations not rejecting the partial adjustment model
i.e., exhibiting a statistically significant coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable ——useaveraged end—of—quarter data (equations 7.2 and
7.4). Combined with the results in Table 6, the evidence suggests that
the traditional use of temporally aggregated data is largely responsible
for the prominence of the partial adjustment model. That is, temporal
aggregation in this case appears to both increase the magnitude of the
coefficient on lagged money and the degree of serial correlation in the
residuals. Using end—of—quarter data, which reduces the possibility of
I
spuriouscorrelation, the partial adjustment model is not unambiguously
better than the alternative involving complete adjustment of money demand
within each quarter.
To examine the predictive ability of end-of—quarter money demand
equations, post—sample static simulations of both the partial adjustment—19—
and serial correlation specifications are presented in Table 8.' In com-
parison to the results using traditional Ml data in Table 2, the 1974—83
simulations yield substantially larger errors. In addition, both the par-
tial adjustment and serial correlation specifications strongly support the
notion that money demand was subject to continued downward shifts through
1981. As before, however, the results indicate that the downward shift
diminished in 1982—83, but money demand remains lower than predicted based
on pre—1974data.' Also similar to the results in Table 2, equations esti-
mated from 1974:Q1 through 198l:Q4 predict the 1982—83 period with much
greatS accuracy. Positive biases are evident, but they amount to less
than 1 percent for both the partial adjustment and serial correlation speci—
fications.4V The underlyingequations used to form these post—sample predic-
tions nevertheless have some questionable characteristics. In particular,
interest rates and wealth are not statistically significant in these equa-
tions. Furthermore, if the partial adjustment model is the true specifica-
tion, then the slower speed of adjustment in the post—1973 period must be
rationalized. If the partial adjustment model is instead deemed to be
untenable, then the alternative complete—adjustment model is plagued by
serially correlated residuals, suggesting possible misspecificatiofl.
2.OTHER SPECIFICATIONS
In this section, the role of expectations in the demand for money is
initially considered. The statistical significance of actual inflation in
a number of the previous empirical money demand equations, among other fac-
tors, motivates this investigation. Next, the robustness of Hamburger's
(1977, 1983) money demand model is examined using the methodology of the—20—
previous sections. Hamburger has presented money demand equations capable
of relatively accurate predictions in both the 1970s and early 19505.124"
A. Expectations and Money Demand
The statistically significant direct impact of actual inflation
in a variety of the estimated money demand equations in the previous sec-
tions may reflect the sensitivity of the demand for money to expected infla-
tion. One possible justification for this effect is that, in the absence of
implicit yields adjusting to market yields, the expected own real rate of
return on money balances moves negatively with changes in expected infla-
tion. A vast majority of previous studies implicitly assume that the real
own—yield on money balances equals the negative of expected inflation, and
then subtract this rate from the other real rates of return entering the
money demand equation. This procedure leads to rates of return specified
as nominal yields, thereby eliminating the direct effect of inflation. Such
a procedure implicitly imposes a zero within—equation adding—up constraint
on the coefficients multiplying real rates of return on money and money sub-
stitutes. However, in a multi—asset framework with imperfect asset substitu-
tability, and in the absence of perfect certainty about future inflation
making all assets risky, such within—equation constraints are in most cases
unwarranted (Roley l983a).
In the first two rows of Table 9, a variable representing expected infla-
tion replaces the previous measure of actual inflation. The specifications
most closely correspond to equations (6.1) and (6.7) in Table 6, and end—of—
quarter financial data are used in both instances.IY In comparison to the
equations reported previously, the only noticeable difference is the point
estimate of the coefficient on expected inflation in the post—1974 sample—21—
period. The estimated standard errors of both equations (9.1) and (9.2)
are virtually the same as those reported for (6.1) and (6.7).
The role of expectations is expanded in the subsequent two equations
reported in Table 9. In these specifications, expectations measures are
formed for income as well as the price level. The price term also is
respecif led to enable a comparison of nominal and real partial adjustment
models. The results again are comparable to similar estimated equations
reported in Table 6, and neither set can be unambiguously preferred on the
basis of these results.
The final four rows consider a random—walk model of money demand (e.
g., Sims 1982). The basic notion behind specifications (9.7) and (9.8) is
that at the end of a given period, money balances held by economic agents
reflect all available information concerning interest rates, income, and
the price level. That is, current information is used to predict future
real transactions, the price level, and the opportunity cost of holding
money balances. On the basis of these forecasts, economic agents determine
their current money holdings to finance future real transactions. It also
is assumed that adjustment to desired holdings is accomplished at every
point in time. At the end of the next period, then, money demand will only
differ from that of the previous period due to innovations in its determin-
ants. The alternative hypothesis, represented by equations (9.5) and (9.6),
is that current expectations of the determinants of money demand also are
useful in predicting.future money balances. For the pre—1974 estimation
period, the random—walk hypothesis can be rejected at the 5 percent level of
significance. In the 1974:Q1—1983:Q4 sample, however, the expectations data
as a group do not significantly affect money demand, and the random—walk—22—
hypothesis ——involvingthe additional constraint b6 =1——cannotbe
rejected at the 5 percent level. The evidence regarding this model must,
nevertheless, be regarded as mixed due to the results reported for the
earlier subsample. Also, on the basis of the complete set of results in
Table 9, variables constructed to represent expectations apparently do
not unambiguously improve the characteristics of empirical money demand
equations.
B. Hamburger's Model
As mentioned, through several adaptations of the conventional
money demand specification, Hamburger (1977, 1983) has been able to esti-
mate equations with somewhat improved post—sample predictive ability over
the 1970s and early 1980s. Appealing to portfolio motives, the specifica-
tion includes the dividend—price yield and a Treasury bond yield. Excluded
fromthespecification is a market yield on a short—ten financial asset.
The price level is constrained as in the nominal adjustment model, and the
long—run income elasticity also is constrained to unity.
Hamburger's (1977) model is empirically examined in Table 10 by considering
its robustness with respect to the use of end—of—quarter Ml data and differ—
encing..?L" On the top half of Table 10, Hamburger's log—levels specification
is estimated over both pre— and post—1974 samples, with both traditional
Ml and end—of—quarter Ml data. The price level and income constraints also
are relaxed in some of the estimated equations. Comparing equation (10.1)
and (10.5), which are estimated with temporally aggregated Ml, the esti-
mated coefficients are quite similar across the different subsamples. In
the earlier estimation period, however, the equation exhibits significantly
autocorrelated residuals, and the estimated standard error is about one—half—23—
that in the later sample period. While the income constraint can be
rejected in the pre—1974 sample (equation 10.2), it cannot be rejected
using post—1974 data (equation 10.6). Similar results emerge using
end—of—quarter Ml data (equations.10.3, 10.4, 10.7, and 10.8), but in
this case the income constraint can be rejected in both estimation
periods.
Differencing the specification causes the robustness of Hamburger's
model to deteriorate. All constraints can be rejected in both the pre—
and post—1974 periods, with the exception of the price constraint using
both traditional and end—of—quarter Ml data in the pre—1974 sample. More-
over1 the estimated coefficient on lagged money is much smaller than in
log—levels specifications, implying more plausible speeds of adjustment
in some equations. Using end—of—quarter data, however, causes this esti-
mated coefficient to become insignificantly different from zero when the
constraints are relaxed (equations 10.12 and 10.16). As was the case with
other specifications, this model does not appear to exhibit the stability
necessary for policy analysis.
4. SECTORAL DEMANDS FOR Ml BALANCES
Part of the relatively poor within— and post—sample performances of
empirical money demand equations could be due to aggregation across diverse
groups of economic agents. Indeed, some of the proposed remedies ——involv-
ing interest—rate ratchet variables and more recently explicit own yields
on transactions balances ——focusdirectly on either business or household
demand for money. As a consequence, the separate demands for money by these
two sectors are examined in this section.—24—
Following Goldfeld (1976), and also to enable comparisons with the
results reported previously, flow—of—funds data are used in this
investigations For households, the basic money demand specification is
identical to that considered previously in, for example, Table 6. For
businesses, the savings deposit rate and the wealth variable are deleted.
As before, estimation results for both log—levels and changes in logs
specifications are presented.
Estimation results for both the 1959:Q3—l973:Q4 and l974:Q1—1983:Q4
sample periods are presented in Table 11. Estimated household money
demand equations are roughly comparable to those reported in Table 6. The
estimated income elasticities in both subsamples are, however, substanti-
ally larger than before, as is the estimated coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable in the earlier subsample (equations 11.1 and 11.5).
Deleting lagged money, it is apparent that the partial adjustment model
(11.1 and 11.5) does not yield any major gains in within—sample fit over
the alternative serial correlation specification (11.2 and 11.6). As
before, either through the implied nominal adjustment model ——imposing
b6 =b7in equation (11.5) ——ordirectly in equation (11.6), inflation
is estimated to have a significant impact on household money demand in the
post—1974 period.'
Estimated money demand equations for the business sector exhibit
somewhat more peculiar properties. First, as is evident in Table 11, a
time trend was included in these specifications. In order to obtain a
positive, although statistically insignificant, estimated income elasti-
city, the addition of a time trend was found to be necessary. Second,
in the partial adjustment specifications, the estimated speed of adjustment—25—
is implausibly slow in the 1959:Q3—1973:Q4 sample. Finally, in the auto—
correlation specification (11.4 and 11.8), inflation is estimated to have
an effect similar to that estimated for household money demand in the post—
1974 period, but the short—term market interest rate does not exhibit a
statistically significant effect in any of the aLternative specifications.
To further examine these sectoral demands, the specifications are
reestthated after differencing. As indicated on the bottom half of Table
11 (equations 11.9 —11.12),the estimated equations in at least one major
respect change dramatically from those estimated in log—levels form. In
particular, not only does the estimated coefficient on lagged money become
insignificantly different f row zero, but the point estimates are negative
in every instance. The impact of inflation on the sectoral demands does,
however, appear to be robust in the post—1974 estimation period.
Despite some of the implausible characteristics of the estimated equa-
tions in Table 11, selected specifications are simulated for comparison
with previous results. In the simulations, the remaining Mi balances not
held by households and businesses are treated as exogenous. Thus, the simu-
lation errors reported for aggregate Ml may be downward biased.
The simulation results for household, business, and the implied aggre-
gate Ml balances are reported in Table 12. Both partial adjustment and
serial correlation specifications are simulated. In simulations over the
1974:Q1—1983:Q4 period, the static simulation errors suggest that despite
the emphasis typically placed on the business sector, household money demand
shifted downward in comparison to the pre—1974 period. The errors are, how-
ever, only a fraction of those reported for sectorally aggregated Ml in
Table 8. The results for business money demand exhibit only small biases,—26--
but the underlying specifications include time trends which shift these
equations progressively downward over time. The results for total Ml
balances predominatly reflect the behavior of household money demand.
The results again suggest that the 1982—83 experience may not be as
unusual as that in 1980—81. where a further downward shift is evident,
some of which was offset in 1982 and 1983.
Post—sample simulations using equations estimated through l981:Q4
exhibit improved predictive ability on average. In these simulations,
reported on the right—hand side of Table 12, only the household money
demand equations yield positive mean errors. When combined with business
money demand equations, the mean errors are slightly negative over the
1982—83 period. The significant role of inflation in the equations under-
lying the simulations primarily accounts for this performance.
5.A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INTEREST ELASTICITY OF Ml DEMAED
As noted in the introductory section, the erratic behavior of Ml
demand since the early l970s has frequently been attributed to financial
innovation and deregulation. To capture the greater economization on
transactions balances supposedly originating primarily in the business
sector, a variety of additional variables have been included in conven-
tional money demand equations. Two of these variables ——asimple time
a
trend and an interest—rate ratchet variable ——arebriefly examined here.
A third variable ——introducedby Cagan (1983) to reflect the own yield
on NOW accounts ——alsois considered, as it has figured prominently in
discussions of the 1982—83 experience. Following the empirical investiga-
tion on the roles of these variables, more fundamental issues regarding—27—
the identification and bias of estimated interest elasticities are considered.
A. Time Trends, Ratchets, and Own Yields
In examining the demand f or money by businesses in the previous sec-
tion, a linear time trend was found to be necessary to obtain a positive esti-
mated income elasticity, at least among the limited number of alternative
explanatory variables considered. This time trend, while not statistically
significant in the pre—1974 estimation period, exhibited a statistically signi-
ficant negative effect on business money demand in the post—1974 sample.
The role of a time trend in explaining total end—of—quarter money demand
is considered in the first four rows of Table 13. Both the partial adjustment
and serial correlation models are estimated over the pre— and post—1974 sam-
ples. As may be expected based on the results reported in Table 7, where
first—differenced data were used, a linear time trend is not found to be sta-
tistically significant in either estimation period.
In the remaining rows of Table 13, an interest—rate ratchet is included
in business and total money demand equations. Following Simpson and Porter
(1980) and Cagan (1983), this variable is defined as the previous peak yield
on 5—year constant maturity Treasury securities. The previous linear time
trend is excluded in all of these specifications.
The estimation results reveal that in only two of the eight specifica-
tions is the interest-rate ratchet significant at even the 10 percent level
(equations 13.9 and 13.12). In both instances, the estimation results are
obtained in the l974:Ql—l983:Q4 sample period using the partial adjustment
specification. In specifications in which the lagged dependent variable
is dropped, the inflation variable appears to statistically dominate the
interest—rate ratchet. The relevance of this variable therefore depends on—28—
the appropriateness of the partial adjustment model. The serial correla-
tion alternative nevertheless yields lower estimated standard errors in
both cases (equations 13.10 and 13.12).
The variable presented by Cagan (1983) and also adopted by Hamburger
(1983) to improve the predictive performance of money demand equations
over the 1983—84 period is considered in the last four rows of Table 13.
This variable ——formedby multiplying the fraction of other checkable
deposits in Ml by 5.25 percent ——issubtracted from the other rates of
return entering the estimated equations. Because this variable presum-
ably reflects the increased sensitivity of households to changes in the
rates of return on competing assets, both household and total money demand
equations are estimated. Also, estimation results are only presented for
the post—1974 sample period since the own—yield variable is either trivi-
ally small or equal to zero throughout the pre—1974 period.
In comparison to the results in Table 11, the addition of this own
yieldgives virtually no improvement over previous results for the house—
-hold sector (equations 13.13 and 13.14). The estimated Treasury bill yield
elasticities do increase slightly in absolute value, but they unif only
remain insignificant at the 5 percent level. With one exception, the
results for total money demand also exhibit similar properties to earlier
estimates reported in Table 6. The exception involves the partial adjust—
ment specification (equation 13.15), in which the Treasury bill yield
elasticity becomes statistically significant at the 5 percent level. On
the basis of this one regression, however, it is difficult to argue for the
relevance of this variable. Nevertheless, its role in the 1982—83 period
is considered explicitly in the concluding section.—29—
B.Identification and Bias
In a very thorough analysis concerning the identification of and
simultaneity biases in empirical money demand equations, Cooley and LeRoy
(1981) reach very pessimistic conclusions. In particular, they conclude
that there is no obvious way to identify money demand equations. As a
consequence, they suggest that all previous empirical money demand equa-
tions are subject to simultaneity bias, and a coefficient likely to be
affected is the interest elasticity of money demand. Laidler (1980) and
Gordon (1984b) also examine simultaneity bias in detail, and their results
suggest that there is potential for significant bias due to both inappro-
priate assumptions about causality among economic time series and neglect
of Federal Reserve reaction functions.
Following Cooley and LeRoy (1981), the potential simultaneity bias
in estimated interest—rate coefficients is considered here by focusing on
the Federal ReserveTs monetary control procedures. The analysis extends
that presented by Cooley and LeRoy in two directions. First, a somewhat
more detailed model of financial market equilibrium is presented, focus-
ing explicitly on Federal Reserve policy behavior. Second, because pro-
blems concerning biases are frequently ignored due to their unknown magni-
tudes, percentage biases in estimated interest rate coefficients are cal-
culated under alternative assumptions about the parameters of the model.

















where is the logarithm of real money balances;i is the nominal short-
ten rate; rr is the logarithm of required reserves;nbr is the logarithm
of nonborrowed reserves; d is the Federal Reserve's discount rate;
a0, a,
A, g, b0 b, and k are positive parameters; andu and v are stochastic
error terms. To avoid analytical complications involving temporal aggregation,
the model is analyzed in a weekly time frame.
The demand for money in this model is represented by equation (7),
where all deterininan other than the interest rate are implicitly represented
by the constant term, a0. The error term in the money demand equation is
assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process
=P'u
+e. (11)
Equation (8) represents the Federal Reserve's short-run money stock
targets. In the absence of shocks, the money stock target for the jth
future period, simply equals the long run target (n+j)g +-n'
where
is the logarithm of the base level of the money stock set n weeks
previously, and g is the target long-run growth rate. In the event of a
deviation from target in the previous week's money stock,m1 -(n-l)g -
allfuture short-tun targets are altered to reflect the Federal Reserve's
partial accomodation of this shock. The parameter A reflects the rate at
which the deviation of money from its long-run target is offset.
The supply of reserves is represented by equation (9). Under the assumption
that excess reserves equal zero, required reserves equal nonborrowed reserves
plus the quantity of borrowed reserves as determined by the borrowings
function. The borrowings function is in turn represented by a constant
amount of frictional borrowing (b0) and the spread between the short-ten
interest rate and the discount rate.-1—31—
Equation (10) represents the demand for reserves under lagged reserve
requirements. In this specification, k is the logarithm of the reserve
requirement ratio. Under the alternative contemporaneous reserve require-
ments (CRR) systems imposed prior to late 1968 and after January l984, some
reserve settlement lags are also involved in practice. Under the current
CRRsystem,the lag is essentially two days (e.g. Sellon 1984).
In this simplified model, the Federal Reserve may choose the level of
the short-term interest rate or nonborrowed reserves in an attempt to achieve
its short-run policy objectives. As implied by LeRoy (1979) and Hetiel (1982),
however; the nonborrowed reserves operating procedure can be regarded as being
very similar to the money markets conditions procedure in the absence of strict
contemporaneous reserve requirements. The main difference is that under the
nonborrowed reserves procedure, the short-term rate fluctuates according to
the error in the borrowings function, while under the money markets
conditions procedure, the short-term rate is approximately constant throughout
the policy period.
To illustrate the biases in estimating the demand for money (7), it is
assumed that the money markets conditions procedure is being implemented by
the Federal Reserve. In estimating money demand (7), the estimated interest—
rate coefficient, —a, may be represented as
—a =—a+ (El u )/(Xi2). (12)
tt tt
For simplicity1 it is assumed that all data are detrended and than (n + j)
8+ m =rn,for all j.Itis also asstmied that, because of reporting
lags, the previous week's money stock is not known by either the public
or the Federal Reserve. Under these assumptions, the bias can be represented
in terms of the parameters of the model. As an intermediate step, however,—32—
it is informative to note that the equilibrium interest rate and itsuncon-
ditional variance can be represented as
-(l/a) + (l/a)p(p + A-1)[ (i_A)ipk_]ej, (13)
j=O k=j
2 2
=p(p + A—i)[1 + (I—X)p] -
a(i—p )[l—(1—A)p][l—(i—A) J
Using (13) and (14), and following some tedious derivations, the percent-
age bias of the negative of the estimated interest—rate coefficient (a >0)
can be expressed as
plim (a) -(a)-- p[1-(1-A)2J
(15) a
—
(p+ A—1)[1 + (i—A)p]
First note that this expression Implies that single—equation estimation of
money demand yields consistent estimates in two cases. First, if the demand
for money has uncorrelated errors (p =0),the bias (15) equals zero. In
this case, i andu are uncorrelated since past values of the residual do
not provide information about future money demand. Second, if the Federal
Reserve accommodates all money demand shocks fully (A =0),the interest rate
again is uncorrelated with current and past residuals leading to consistent
estimates.
Biases are calculated for intermediate cases in Table 14. As is apparent
in the table, the magnitude of the bias is extremely sensitive to moderate
changes in the parameters. Also, the bias can be either positive or nega—
tive, the former occurring when the monetary authority more than accommodates
the money demand shock. That is, a positive bias occurs if the effect of the
money demand shock deteriorates more rapidly over time, based on the autocor—
relation coefficient, than the short—run money path approaches the long—run
target.—33—
These results have direct implications for the empirical money demand
equations presented previously. In particular, the estimates of conven-
tional money demand equations presented in Table 1 exhibit some biases in
the pre—1974 period. If the partial adjustment model is rejected, then all
estimation results using either traditional Ml or end-of—quarter Ml data
also are biased, and the biases could be large. If the partial adjustment
model using end—of—quarter data represents the true model, however, the
estimated coefficients are consistent on the basis of this analysis. Unf or—
tunately, in this case the majority of the estimated interest—rate coeff i—
cients are not statistically significant, and the estimated partial adjust-
ment parameter exhibits instability over different estimation periods.
C. Other Factors Relating to the Interest Elasticity
Most recent discussions concerning the interest elasticity of money
demand have focused on the implications of the greater availability of
close money substitutes paying market rates of return as well as the increas-
ingly competitive rates of return that have been and will continue to be paid
on transactions balances. As a consequence, it has been suggested that these
factors have increased the interest elasticity of money demand. In addition,
further increases are hypothesized for the future, at least until the point
is reached in which rates of return on transactions balances completely
reflect market yields.
These recent analyses, however, seemingly assi.nne thattheinterest—
elasticity is invariant to other factors. An exception is provided by Walsh
(1982, 1984), who examines the effects of different monetary policy regimes
on the interest elasticity of money demand. In particular, in either Tobin's
(1958) model of the speculative demand for money or the stochastic version—34—
of the transactions model presented by Buiter and Armstrong (1978), the
sensitivity of money demand to interest rates depends on the variance of
the market yield. As represented by (14), this variance in turn depends
on other factors including the Federal Reservets short—run policy para-
meter, A. Moreover1 this expression also is influenced by the Federal
Reserve's choice of its monetary control procedure. In particular, a non—
borrowed reserves procedure introduces the variance of the error in the
borrowings function, v1, into the variance of the interest rate (14).
Given the dramatic rise in the volatility of interest rates in the 1979—82
period (e.g., Roley l983b), as well as the coincident change in monetary
control procedures, these factors may have exerted a greater influence
on the interest elasticity of money demand than those related strictly to
financial innovation and deregulation. Furthermore, in contrast to these
latter factors, an increased variance of the market yield typically reduces
the interest—rate coefficient (e.g., Walsh 1982, 1984).
The empirical results presented earlier also do not provide any evid-
ence that the interest rate elasticity of money demand increased when com-
paring the pre— and post—1974 periods. Estimated Treasury bill yield elas-
ticities in Table 1 for the conventional log—levels specification are uni-
formly lower in the post—1974 period. Similar results are obtained when
this specification is estimated in differenced form in Table 3. Moreover,
estimated Treasury bill yield elasticites using end—of—quarter data are
typically insignificant in both subsamples, as reported in Tables 6 and 7.
In addition to the possible estimation biases mentioned previously,
two other reasons for these results appear to be logical candidates. First,
all specifications are estimated either with an inflation variable or with—35—
nominal adjustment imposed, which embodies an indirect inflation effect.
Given that nominal short—term yields are highly correlated with infla-
tion, these specifications may have led to downward biased estimates of
the interest elasticity. To examine this possibility, several equations
in Table 6 were reestimated without the inflation term,
Pt In the
1959—73 sample period, the deletion of the inflation term does not
change either the positive sign or the magnitude of the estimated Treasury
bill yield elasticity in equation (6.1).In. the post—1974 period, however,
the estimated elasticity increases in absolute value from 0.0129 to 0.0212
in equation (6.7). In the serial correlation specification, the estimated
interest elasticity actually declines in absolute value from 0.0048 to
0.0004 in the latter subsample. Thus, the only potential gain in the size
of this estimated elasticity is found for the partial adjustment model in
the post—1974 period.
Second, the comparison of equations (6.7) and (6.13) in Table 6 sug-
gests that the estimated interest rate elasticity may increase as more
observations are dropped following 1974:Q1. In particular, the estimated
elasticity for the 1975:Q3—l983:Q4 subsample is over 80 percent larger
than that estimated for the entire post—1974 sample. When progressively
later starting dates are used following 1974:Ql, the estimated interest
rate elasticity is in fact maximized with a value of 0.0252 for the sample
period beginning on 1976:Q2. For starting dates after 1976:Q2, the esti-
mated elasticity declines. When the inflation variable is deleted in the
partial adjustment model and this exercise is repeated, the interest rate
elasticity takes a maximtsn value of 0.0324 for the 1975:Q4—1983:Q4 sample
period. Similar procedures applied to the serial correlation specification,—36—
both with and without the inflation term, failed to achieve any noticeable
changes in the estimated elasticity. In sun, while the inflation term in
some specifications reduces the statistical significance of the estimated
interest—rate elasticity in the post—1974 period, there is no evidence
that this elasticity progressively increased in size since the mid l970s.
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR MONEY DEMAND IN TIlE l970s AND 1980s
The empirical results presented in this paper are summarized in this
section. Econometric issues raised earlier are first discussed. The
results are then summarized in tens of their implications for money demand
stability since the early 1970s and the unprecedented decline in Ml velo-
city in 1982 and 1983.
A. Econometric Issues
As noted earlier, a number of recent studies ——includingthose
by Laidler (1980), Cooley and LeRoy (1981), Goodfriend (1983), and Gordon
(l984a, 1984b) ——raiseimportant econometric issues concerning empirical
money demand equations. This research focused mainly on the implications
of simultaneity bias, measurement errors, and the plausibility of the
partial adjustment model. In addition to these issues, the implications
of the temporal aggregation of financial data were explored here.
In terms of simultaneity bias, the implications of the Federal Reserve's
monetary control procedures were examined. In this case, the potential
for simultaneity bias •arises if money demand errors are serially correlated,
and the Federal Reserve responds to these errors in an attempt to control
the money stock. Using specific examples, it was found that the neglect of
simultaneity bias leads to biases in estimated coefficients that are poten-
tially large. The magnitude of the biases is highly uncertain, however,—37—
as it varies greatly depending on the degree of both serial correlation
and monetary control.
Empirical results concerning the partial adjustment model also were
rather pessimistic. In particular, it is not clear that the partial
adjustmentmodel ——eitherin real or nominal terms ——shouldbe prefer-
red overspecifications simply accounting for serially correlated resid-
uals. The robustness of the partial adjustment model ——atleast when
estimated over the 1974—83 period ——againmay be questioned on the basis
of estimation results obtained after differencing the specifications.
Finally, on a positive note, the presence of serially correlated
residuals in the conventional partial adjustment model evident in thepre—
1974 sample (equations 1.1 through 1.8 in Table 1) appears to be due to
the use of temporally aggregated Ml data, and this problem can be cor-
rected (equation 6.1 in Table 6). Moreover, if money demand equations
do not exhibit autocorrelation, the estimated equations will be less sub-
ject to simultaneity bias. However, the quality of end—of—period data
may be questioned, and the partial adjustment model itself may simply
reflect either serially correlated residuals or measurement errors.
B. Money Demand Shifts in the l970s and l980s
The consensus result emerging from the variety of specifications
estimated over the 1959—73 sample period is that the demand for Ml balances
exhibited at least one shift after 1973. Shifts were suggested by both
partial adjustment and serial correlation money demand specifications, using
both temporally aggregated and end—of—quarter financial data. Because of
the econometric issues raised above, however, these results should be viewed
as tentative.—38—
For traditional log-levels specifications estimated over the 1959—73
period, static simulation results reported in Table 2 indicated that money
demand shifted as early as 1975:Ql, and perhaps exhibited a further tempor-
ary downward shift in 1980 and 1981. The simulation results additionally
suggested that part of this temporary shift was reversed in 1982 and 1983.
When the conventional specifications were differenced, the persistent level
shift in the mid—1970s appeared as a single negative forecast error fol-
lowed by a series of mean zero errors in Table 4. The results again sug-
gest that money demand shifted downward in 1975:Ql. A further downward
shift was apparent in 1981, which was offset in 1982. The results for 1983
failed to indicate any further upward shifts.
Using end—of—quarter financial data, simulation results reported in
Table 6 for specifications estimated through 1973 suggest that the money
demand shift increased in size throughout 1974, remained relatively stable
from 1975 through 1978, and then progressively shifted downward again from
1979 through 1981. A partial reversal of this latter shift was apparent
in 1982 and 1983.
Estimation results of these various models also cast doubt on the sta-
bility of estimated coefficients in money demand equations estimated over
the 1959—73 and 1974—83 periods. Moreover, in the partial adjustment model
estimated with either temporally aggregated or end—of—quarter data (Tables
F-
1and 6), the greatly reduced speed of partial adjustment estimated in the
latter period, despite the recent emphasis on cash management and other
related factors, suggests implausible behavior. When equations using. tem-
porally aggregated data were differenced, the estimated speed of adjustment
instead increased in the post—1974 sample (Table 3), as might be expected.—39—
In first—difference specifications nsing end—of—quarter data, however, the
estimated coefficient on lagged real money balances was either significantly
negative or not significantly different from zero for both subsamples
(Table 7).
A number of the specifications modified to explain the behavior of
money demand following 1974 also were examined. As already discussed, the
first—difference specification suggested by Hafer and Hem (1980), among
others, seems, better suited in describing the permanent level shifts
witnessed after 1974. Moreover, when traditional data are used, first—
differencing probably reduces some of the spurious correlation caused by
temporal aggregation and trends.
Following Hamburger (1977) andB.Friedman (1978), a variable reflect-
ing wealth also was included in the estimated equations. The estimated
coefficient on this variable was, however, typically insignificant in post—
1974 regressions (tables 1, 3, 6, and 10). The coefficient constraints
imposed by Hamburger (1977) also were examined, and the constraint on income
elasticity was rejected in virtually all cases (Table 10). Interest—rate
ratchet variables and time trends were additionally included in some specifications.
Estimated equations including these variables again failed to either restore
stability in estimated coefficients across the pre— and post—1974 periods
or result in estimated coefficients robust across different specifications
(Table 13).
There are a number of potential sources of these results. Again, simul-
taneity bias and the different monetary policy regimes during the 1974—83
period, especially in comparison to the earlier period, may provide part of
the explanation. A related area involving financial innovation and—40--
deregulation also may have introduced coefficient instability and apparent
shifts. Variables such as time trends and interest-rate ratchets may be
poor proxies for these factors. Also in a similar context, the definition
of the narrowly defined money stock may be inappropriate. Cagan (1983),
for example, achieved greater stability in estimated money demand equa-
tions by broadening the current definition of Ml.
C. Implications for the 1982—83 Decline in Ml Velocity
Several explanations have been advanced for the unprecedented
decline in Ml velocity in 1982 and 1983. Cagan (1983) and Hamburger (1983)
explained most of the decline using empirical money demand equations in
which the rate of return on NOW accounts was introduced in a manner that
increased the interest rate elasticity. The sharp drop in interest rates
beginning in mid 1982 then resulted in a pronounced increase in the demand
for money. Simpson (1984) also suggested that the interest rate elasticity
increased, but that it does not completely explain the 1982—83 experience.
Judd and McElhattan (1983) similarly relied on the interest—rate decline in
explaining the 1982—83 period, but in their model the interest—rate elasti-
city was assumed to remain stable. Tatom (1983) deemphasized the roles of
interest rates and financial deregulation, and instead focused on the cycli-
cal behavior of the economy. In contrast, Gordon (l984b) suggested that a
substantial part of the puzzle is explained by the consequences of finan-
cial deregulation, which added deposits with low turnover to Ml. Similarly,
Hafer (1984) found more historically normal relationships between money and the
economy when interest—bearing checkable deposits were excluded from Ml.
The simulation results presented for log—levels specifications estimated
through 1973, summarized above, suggested that the demand for money experi-
enced an upward shift in 1982—83 in comparison to 1980—81 (Table 2 and 8).
As mentioned previously, however, these results also can be—41—
interpreted as a transitory downward shift in 1980 and 1981, with money
demand returning to more normal post—1974 levels following 1981. Simula-
tion results for first—difference specifications estimated through 1973
reflected similar behavior. In particular, a fairly large upward shift
was evident in l982:Q4, but this shift merely offsets a part of the down-
ward shift in 1981.
Simulation results for money demand equations estimated over the
1974—81 period also suggested an upward shift in 1982—83. Using either
temporally aggregated or end—of—quarter data, however, this shift averages
less than one percent of the actual money stock (Tables 2 and 6). Never-
theless, as reported in the respective tables, the underlying equations
used in the simulations do not conform well to empirical money demand
equations typically reported.
The role of the rate of return on NOW accounts was examined in Table
13. For the 1974—83 sample period, this variable did not improve the esti-
mation properties of the demand for money. As constructed, however, this
variable is primarily relevant for the last several years of this period.
To consider its impact in the 1982—83 period, the residuals from equation
(13.15) in Table 13 were compared to those of equation (6.7) in Table 6,
which only differs by the addition of the rate of return on NOW accounts
in (13.15). These equations also were estimated both with and without the
inflation variable. With the inflation term included, the largest percent
errors ——occurringin l983:Ql—Q2 ——werereduced by less than 0.1 per-
centage points. Without the inflation variable, the largest improvement
was 0.2 percentage points in 1983:Q2. Thus, in these specifications, this
own—yield variable provided only negligible increases in explanatory power.—42—
Nevertheless, the simulation errors for 1982—83 reported for equations
estimated through 1981 are not large by historical standards, especially
when compared to errors obtained for the mid 1970s.
The empirical investigation reported here only focused on the current
definition of Ml. As mentioneiL other researchers ——includingCagan (1983),
Hafer (1984), and Gordon (1984b) ——haveconsideted bath broader and narrower
measures of Ml with some success. In particular, it appears that alternative
definitions are capable of resolving at least part of the 1982—83 puzzle.
Future research on the demand for money may therefore benefit by considering
these alternatives, especially given the overall poor performance of empiri-
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1.Much of this research is summarized in Laidler (1977), Feige and Pearce
(1977), and Judd and Scadding (1982).
2.This approach follows a much longer tradition' and is stressed, for
example, by H. Friedman (1956) and Brainard and Tobin (1968).
3.B. Friedman (1978) also suggests that the significance of the dividend—
price ratio in Hamburger's (1977) model is primarily due to its corre-
lation with wealth since dividends are relatively sluggish over time.
Hamburger's empirical results also have been critiqued by Hafer and
Hem (1979). For a rejoinder, see Hamburger (1983). Another promin-
ent empirical investigation of the role of wealth in money demand is
provided by Meltzer (1963).
4. In addition to the empirical equations for total Ml demand reported
here, other specifications using real consumption expenditures and
the deflator on consumption expenditures were estimated. Per capita
specifications also were considered. In all cases, the empirical
results did not differ significantly from those reported.
5.All of these data, with the exception of the savings deposit rate, were
taken from the Citibank database. The savings deposit rate is from the
MPSmodeldatabase.
6.The source for this variable is the Federal Reserve's flow of funds
accounts. Seasonally adjusted levels were formed using B. Friedman's
(1977) procedure. Because capital gains account for most of the vari-
ance in this series, the seasonally adjusted and unadjusted series are
very similar, and the estimation results were virtually unchanged when
the unadjusted series was used.
7.There is in fact evidence that the Federal Reserve's change in operat-
ing procedures altered the relationship between money and interest
rates, at least in the context of weekly money announcements. See, for
example, Roley (l983a) and Roley and Walsh (1985).
8.Fackler and McMillin claim that in many instances the iterative Cochrane—
Orcutt procedure converges to a local maximum of the likelihood func-
tion. To estimate the serial correlation coefficient in this and sub-
sequent tables, 0.02 Increments of p are considered over the range —1.0
to 1.0.—44—
9.In dynamic simulations starting in 1974:Q1, the cumulative errors in
1981:Q4 are —11.77 and —11.24 percent for equations (1.3) and (1.7),
respectively. In 1983:Q4, the cumulative errors are —8.67 and —7.95
percent for these same two equations. In simulations starting in
1982:Q1, the cumulative errors In 1983:Q4 are —7.52 and —6.78 percent
for equations (1.3) and (1.7), respectively.
10. In dynamic simulations starting in 1982:Q1, the cumulative errors in
1983:Q4 are 4.25 and 4.23 percent for equations (1.11') and (1.15'),
respectively.
11.As might be expected in the presence of permanent level shifts, how-
ever, the dynamic simulation errors in terms of levels for equations
(3.3) and (3.7) are substantially larger. In particular, in simula-
tions starting in 1974:Ql, the cumulative errors are —13.11 and —12.65
percent in 198l:Q4, respectively, and -8.44 and -7.18 percent in
1983:Q4, respectively. In simulations starting in l982:Q4, the ctmiu—
lative errors in l983:Q4 are 6.76 and 7.45 percent for equations (3.3)
and (3.7), respectively.
12.Both equations (3.13) and (3.17) were initially estimated over the
1974:Ql—l98l:Q4 subsample. Variables were deleted from the specif i—
cations if their estimated coefficientshad signs inconsistent with
the transactions model (6). As a result, both specifications reduced
to equation (3.13'). This methodology is followed for all, equations
used in subsequent simulations.
13.In a dynamic simulation starting in l982:Ql, the cumulative error in
l983:Q4 is 12.20 percent for equation (3.13') when transformed into
levels.
14.While still using temporally aggregated data, some quarterly studies
have not used quarterly averaged data. In the ME'Smodel,for example,
average Mlduringthe last month of the quarter and the first month
of the next quarter is used. Laidler (1980) also follows this procedure.
15.Biases due to temporal aggregation also can be interpreted in the mea-
surement error context of Goodfriend (1983).
16.To form seasonally adjusted levels, seasonally adjusted flows were ctmiu—
latively subtracted fromthereported level for l983:Q4.
17. The same savings deposit rate as before is used. Movements in this
series primarily reflect discrete changes in Regulation Qceilings,
and only minor differences arise when end—of—quarter data are used.
18.End—of—quarter Treasury bill yield data also are averaged in these
equations.—45-
19.Formal tests of the partial adjustment model indicate that it cannot
be rejected at the S percent level of significance. However, this
test involves the statistical significance of lagged independent vari-
ables1 some of which have insignificant estimated coefficients oncon-
temporaneous values. Thus, this test is not likely to be powerful
against the alternative hypothesis. For a further discussion of these
tests, along with an application to money demand, see Domowitz and
Hakkio (1984).
20.As before, variables were deleted if their estimated coefficients had
theoretically incorrect signs.
21. In dynamic simulations starting in l974:Q1, the cumulative errors in
198l:Q4 are —13.58 and —15.46 for equations (6.1') and (6.3'),, respec-
tively. In l983:Q4, the cumulative errors are —11.45 and —11.49 per-
cent for these same two equations. In simulations starting in 1982:Q1,
the cumulative errors in 1983:Q4 are —11.45 and —11.49 percent for
equations (6.1') and (6.3'), respectively.
22. In dynamic simulations starting in 1982:Q1, the cumulative errors in
l983:Q4 are 1.29 and 4.32 percent for equations (6.7') and (6.9'),
respectively.
-
23.Other money demand models ——includingthose presented by Carr and
Darby (1981) and Judd and Scadding (1981) ——arenot considered here
for further empirical investigation. Laidler (1980) examines the f or—
mer model in some detail. In addition to his analysis, it should be
noted that the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable
is implausibly large in many of their reported regressions. For a
detailed analysis of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco model,
see Anderson and Rasche (1982).
24.Expectations data are formed from fourth—order autoregressions esti-
mated over the same sample periods as those used to estimate the money
demand equation.
25. Hamburger's more recent model only differs from his earlier model in
that Cagan's (1983) own—yield variable is included in the recent model.
This variable only has the potential for significant effects in the
latter part of the sample, and it is considered in the fifth and sixth
sections.
26.Replacing real GNF with real consumption expenditures causes the
coefficient on the inflation term to become insignificantly dif-
ferent from zero. Despite this difference, both the within— and
post—sample errors remain relatively unaffected. See Roley (1985).—46—
27.The model more closely follows the simplified version presented by
Roley and Troll (1984). The difference between this niodel and that
presented by Gordon (1984b) relates to the different emphasis on
the effects of short—run monetary control. In particular, as
described below in the text, equation (8) describes the Federal
Reserve's short-run monetary target for a given long—run growth
target, g.In contrast, Gordon basically considers. g, as well as
alternative long—run targets, and not short—run control procedures.
28.Equation (9) actually relates to the logarithms of required and
nonborrowed reserves, and a borrowing function specified in terms
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* Significantdtthe 5 percent level.
**Significantat the 110 percent level.
aNumbersin parentheses are standard errors of estimated coefficients. n is the Flildreth-Lu
2 first-order serial correlation cofficient.
PRismultiple correlation coefficient corrected for degrees of freedom, SEE is the standard
error of estimate, and OW is the Ourbin-Watson statistic. When an equation is corrected
for serial correlation, summary statistics correspond to the transformed equation.
=naturallogarithm of Ml, quarterly average, divided by the GM? deflator.
*naturallogarithm of the 6—month coercial paper rate, quarterly average.
*naturallogarithm of the 3-month Treasury bill yield, quarterly average.
=naturallogarithm of the savings deposit rate, quarterly average (liPS model).
*naturallogarithm of real ON?, $l972b.
=naturallogarithm of the total value of equities (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Flow of Funds Accounts) divided by the GM? deflator.
=naturallogarithm of the GM? deflator, 1972 =100.
=randomerror term.
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POST-S&MPLE STATIC SIMULATION RESULTS FOR CONVENTIONAL LEVELS SFEC!FICATIONS
Equation (1.3) Equation (1.7) Equation (1.11') Equation (1.15')
Error Error Error Error
Period 51972b I $1972b I 51972b 1 $1972b 1
74:Q1 0.89 0.37 1.11 0.46 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —0.22 —0.09—0.45 —0.19 —— —— —— ——
Q3 0.88 0.37 0.76 0.33 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —0.72 —0.31—0.48 —0.21 —— —— —— ——
75:Q1 —3.56 —1.57—3.21 —1.41 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —2.59 —1.14 —2.14 —0.94 —— —— ——
Q3 —1.77 —0.78—1.18 —0.52 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —5.11 —2.27—4.62 —2.05 —— —— —— ——
76:Q1 —4.87 —2.15—4.22 —1.87 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —3.87 —1.70—3.26 —1.43 —— —— —— ——
Q3 —5.16 —2.27—4.53 —1.99 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —3.98 —1.75—3.24 —1.42 —— —— —— ——
77:Q1 —3.17 —1.38—2.29 —0.99 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —4.77 —2.06—4.06 —1.76 —— —— —— ——
Q3 —4.31 —1.86—3.47 —1.50 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —3.03 —1.30—2.32 —1.00 —— —— —— ——
78:Q1 —2.77 —1.18—2.00 —0.85 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —3.94 —1.69—3.27 —1.40 —— —— —— ——
Q3 —4.27 —1.83—3.62 —1.55 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —4.36 —1.88—3.79 —1.63 —— —— —— ——
79:Q1 —5.60 —2.43—4.88 —2.12 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —3.69 —1.60—2.91 —1.26 —— —— —— ——
Q3 —3.69 —1.59—3.16 —1.36 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —6.18 —2.68—5.73 —2.49 —— —— —— ——
80:Ql —4.30—1.87 —3.66 —1.60 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —12.27 —5.55 —11.77 —5.33 —— —
—— ——
Q3 —2.24 —0.99—1.40 —0.62 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —5,84 —2.60—5.47 —2.43 —— —— —— ——
81:Q1 —9.28 —4.19—8.52 —3.89 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —6.37 —2.86—5.73 —2.57 —— —— —— ——
Q3 —9.21 —4.19—8.61 —3.92 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —9.11 —4.19—8.43 —3.88 —— —— —— ——
82:Q1 —4.76 —2.16—4.03 —1.83 2.48 1.12 2.47 1.12
Q2 —9.28 —4.24—8.66 —3.96—1.49 —0.68—1.46 —0.67
Q3 —7.33 —3.33—6.90 —3.13 0.18 0.08 0.08 0.04
Q4 —3.48 —1.53—2.73 —1.20 4.72 2.09 4.71 2.08
83:Q1 —4.91 —2.13 —4.18 —1.81 3.50 1.52 3.58 1.55
Q2 —4.90 —2.08—4.24 —1.80 2.75 1.17 2.83 1.20
Q3 —4.95 —2.07—4.31 —1.80 1.76 0.74 1.86 0.78
Q4 —6.94 —2.90—5.26 —2.61—0.7 —0.33—0.67 —0.22
ME (74—81) —4.33 —1.91—3.77 —1.67 —— —— —— ——
R}ISE(74—81) 5.16 2.30 4.65 2.08 —— —— —— ——
NE82—83) =—5.82 —2.56—5.16 —2.27 1.64 0.711.67 0.73
RMSE (82—83) 6.08 2.70 5.47 2.44 2.61 1.19 2.62 1.20
Notes: Equations (1.11') and (1.15') are estimated from 19742Q1 through 1981:Q4.
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(0.2571) (0.0070) (0.1556) (0.0355) (0.0153) (0.1051)
Errorstatic simulation error and percentage error in tens of real Ml balances (51972b).
ME (74—81) —staticsimulation mean error from 1974:Ql through 1981:Q4.
RNSE (74—81) =staticsimulation root—mean—square error from1974:Q1through 1921:Q4.
ME (82—83) =staticsinuletion mean error from1982:Q1through 1983:Q4.
RNSE (82—83) =staticsimulation root—mean—square error from 1982:Ql through 1983:Q4.TABLE 3







+ + b6•& +b7•(pi_p)+
Sample:______________________________________________________________
______ _______ b7 SEE DW
(3+1) —.00002 _.0121**_.0073 -- .1401**.0216* .5623*4949* .44 .0049 2.21
(.00104)(.0065) (.0234) (.0844) (.0085) (.1176) (.1954)
(3.2) .00002 _.0150* —.0191 -— .1648**. .5704*4995* +38 .0051 2.05
(.OO1O9)(.0067) (.0241) (.0882) (.1237) (.2055)
(3.3) —.00005 _.0l22* -.0060 --.146I.0217*5499k (=b ) .45 .0048 2.20
(.0O102)(.0064) (.0229) (.0819) (.0084) (.1110)
6
(3.4) —.00001 _.015O* -.0177 -- .1711* —- ,5574*(=b ) .39 .0051 2.04
(.001O8)(.0066) (.0236) (.0856) (.1168)
6
(3.5) —.00005 —- -.0086-.0070.1383.0236* .5504* .4576* .41 .0050 2.17
(.00106) (.0239) (.0060) (.0861) (.0085) (.1222) (.1976)
(3.6) —.00001 —.0223 -.0083.1652** -- .5528*.4509* .34 .0053 1.93
(.00112) (.0248) (.0063) (.0909) (.1298) (.2098)
(3.7) -.00009 -.0069 -.0068.1463** .0237* .5318* (=b6) .42 .0049 2.16
(.00105) (.0235) (.0059) (.0837) (.0085) (.1144)
(3.8)-.00005 -.0206 -.0081 .1740* -- .5323*(=b ) .35 .0053 1.92





(3.9) -.0022 -.0023 .0144 -- .3129**.0131 .3325**1.156* .27 .0106 2.15
(.0020) (.0164) (.2575) (.1719) (.0231) (.1800) (.3853)
(3.10) —.0023 -.0077 .0328 —— .3252**—— 3573*1.215k .28 .0105 2.14
(.0020) (.0133) (.2529) (.1688) (.1728) (.3673)
(3.11) -.0019 —.0050 .0311 -— .2986 .0229 •3337** (=b ) .16 .0114 2.47
(.0022) (.0175) (.2748) (.1833) (.0243) (.1922)
6
(3,12) —.0020 —.0149 .0654 .3114** -— .3838*
(=b6)
.17 .0114 2.45
(.00.22) (.0139) (.2719) (.1817) (.1858)
(3.13) -.0020 -— —.0146.0104 .2680 .0213.29661.126 .27 .0106 2.03
(.0020) (.2532) (.0159) (.1693) (.0211) (.1780) (.3845)
(3.14) -.0020 -— .0045 .0030.2792** —— .3345**1.243* .27 .0106 2.01
(.0020) (.2526) (.0142) (.1690) (.1740) (.3665)
(3.15) —.0017 —- —.0057 .0100 .2367 .0332.2957 (rb6)
.17 .0113 2.35
(.0021) (.2709) (.0171) (.1807) (.0220) (.1905)
(3.16) —.0016 -- .0273—.0022 .2501 -- .3580**(=b6)
.14 .0115 2.33
(.0022) (.2750) (.0153) (.1837) (.1894)
Note: See the notes in Table 1.
=randomerror term.TABLE 4
POST—SAMPLE STATIC SIMULATION RESULTS FOR CONVENTIONAL
FIRST DIFFERENCESSPECIFICATIONS
Equation (3.3) Equation (3.7) Equation (3.13')
Error Error Error
Period $1972b _____ $1972b _____ $l972b _____
74:Q1 0.49 0.20 0.73 0.30 —— ——
Q2 —1.15 —0.48 —1.68 —0.70 —— ——
03 0.42 0.18 0.24 0.10 —— ——
Q4 —1.86 —0.80 —1.45 —0.63 —— ——
75:Q1 —3.52 —1.55 —3.13 —1.38 —— ——
Q2 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.44 —— ——
Q3 0.75 0.33 0.72 0.32 —— ——
Q4 —3.11 —1.38 —3.08 —1.37 —— ——
76:Q1 —0.58 —0.26 —0.44 —0.20 —— ——
Q2 0.96 0.42 0.91 0.40 —— ——
Q3 0.95 —0.42 —0.92 —0.40 —— ——
Q4 0.76 0.33 0.88 0.38 —— ——
77:Q1 1.18 0.51 1.32 0.57 —— ——
Q2 —1.10 —0.48 —1.25 —0.54 —— ——
Q3 0.19 0.08 0.13 0.06 —— ——
Q4 1.36 0.58 1.17 0.50 —— ——
78:Q1 0.78 0.33 O82 0.35 —— ——
Q2 —1.14 —0.49 —1.33 —0.57 —— ——
Q3 —0.54 —0.23 —0.70 —0.30 —— ——
Q4 —0.30 —0.13 —0.60 —0.26 —— ——
79:Q1 —1.39 —0.60 —1.34 —0.58 —— ——
Q2 1.40 0.60 1.43 0.62 —— ——
Q3 0.42 0.18 0.25 0.11 —— ——
Q4 —2.17 —0.94 —2.40 —1.04 —— ——
80:Q1 0.88 0.38 0.81 0.35 —— ——
Q2 —7.87 —3.56 —7.68 —3.47 —— ——
03 7.07 3.14 7.12 3.16 —— ——
Q4 —1.13 —0.50 —1.62 —0.72 —— ——
81;Q1 —3.82 —1.72 —3.73 —1.68 —— ——
Q2 1.80 0.81 1.70 0.76 —— ——
Q3 —2.45 —1.12 —2.54 —1.16 —— ——
Q4 —0.93 —0.43 —0.77 —0.35 —— ——
82:Q1 4.16 1.88 4.18 1.89 2.92 1.33
Q2 —3.12 —1.43 —3.05 —1.40 —1.55 —0.71
Q3 0.97 0.44 0.90 0.41 0.83 0.38
Q4 4.33 1.91 4.78 2.11 6.74 2.98
83:Q1 0.36 0.15 0.62 0.27 4.09 [.78
Q2 0.62 0.26 0.64 0.27 1.16 0.49
Q3 0.53 0.22 0.48 0.20 1.43 0.60
Q4 —1.61 —0.67 —1.52 —0.63 —0.73 —0.31
ME (74—81) —0.49 —0.22 —0.51 —0.23
EMSE (74—81) 2.40 1.09 2.39 1.08
ME (82—83) 0.78 0.35 0.88 0.39 1.86 0.82
RMSE (82—83) 2.50 1.19 2.59 1.23 3.12 1.44
Notes: See the notes in Tables 1 and 2. Equation (3.13') is estimated from l974:Q1






























MFF =Ml,end of quarter (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Flow of Funds Accounts)
AI4FF =(MFF+HFF

























































































.2729' .0718 -_.99 .0064 1.93
(.1377) (.3382)
.1143 -.0507 .12 .99 .0062 1.96
(.1378) (.3223) (.13)
-- -.0945 .20 .98 .0062 2.89
(.3120) (.13)
.6015* .6761' --.99 .0042 1.33
(.1097) (.2278)
.4365* .5916'39* .99 .0038 1.54
(.1085) (.1924) (.12)
-— .3717".52' .98 .0042 1.34
(.1963) (.11)
.7645* .7028" --.80 .0112 2.17
(.0910) (.4064)
.8195* .6623-.18 .83 .0113 1.97
(.0839) (.4055) (.16)
1.138'.92' .33 .0111 1.81
(.3752) (.06)
.9134* 1.243' —-.91 .0073 1.29
(.0637) (.2726)
.5754' 1.341*.90' .60 .0068 1.54
(.1331) (.2471) (.07)
9577' .92' .41 .0083 0.94
(.2807) (.06)
.7603* .5744 —-.80 .0109 2.16
(.1022)(.4323)
.7957'.5104 -.16 .84 .0110 1.95
(.0982) (.4258) (.17)
--1.010'.92' .18 .0116 1.78
(.4412) (.07)
.7951' ,7427* --.78 0074 2.24
(.0847) (.3328)
.8063* .6366* -.22 .93 .0083 1.89
(.0775) (.3130) (.17)







































































dependent variable In the regression.
natural logarithm of end of quarter Ml (Roard of Governor of the Federal Reserve Ssytem,
Flow of Funds Accounts) divided by the GNP deflator.
(mff +mff
natural logarithm of last week in the quarter MI divided by the GNP deflator.TABLE 7





+ b3.t1rtb +b4AYt ÷bsAwt + b6Am + b7 A(p +
Sample: Coefficient Estimates Summary Statistics
59:Q4— —2
73Q4LHS b0 b2______ b5___b7 R SEE DIV
(7.1) Ainff.0008 _.0681** .0168** .2946* .0362* —.2391**_.2156 .21 .0077 1.84
(.0017) (.0376) (.0086) (.1348) (.0141) (.1352) (.2981)
(7.2) aamff.0004 _.O371** .0106* .1635* .0247* .3501* .5250* .50 .0045 1.56
(.0010) (.0220) (.0051) (.0801) (.0084) (.1143) (.1816)
73 :Qi—
83:Q4
(7.3)Miff _.0042**_.0329 -.0041•4374* .0468* -.0208 1.122* .32 .0118 1.69
(.0022) (.2827) (.0117) (.1711) (.0210) (.1458) (.3845)
(7.4) tamff-.0016.0950 .0064 .1076 .0227** .5900* 1.356* .63 .0069 1.60
(.0013)(.1663) (.0067) (.1109) (.0124) (.1220) (.2409)
75:Q3—
83:Q4
(7.5)Miff -.0024—.0447 -.0003.3122.0666* -.0076 1.012* .16.0121 1.84
(.0027)(.2938) (.0134) (.2098) (.0325) (.1653) (.4428)
(7.6)Saw-.0006 -.2148 .0017 .1994.0653* .1977.6856** .18 .0103 2.15
(.0023)(.2488) (.0113) (.1792) (.0280) (.1722) (.3820)
Note: Seethe notes in Table 1, 2, and 6.TABLE 8
POST—SANFLE STATIC SiMULATIONRESULTS FOR LEVELS SPECIFICATIONS
USINGEND OF QUARTER DATA
Equation (6.1') Equation (6.3') Equation (6.7') qtion (5•9t)
Error Error Error Error
Period $1972b Z $1972b 2 $1972b 2 $1972b 2
74:Q1 —2.9 —1.1 —3.0 —1.2 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —4.4 —1.8 —5.0 —2.0 —— —— —— ——
Q3 —4.0 —1.6 —4.6 —1.9 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —5.6 —2.3 —7.3 —3.0 —— —— —— ——
75:Q1 —9.6 —4.0 —11.4 —4.8 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —3.7 —1.5 —6.5 —2.7 —— —— —— ——
Q3 -9.4 —3.9 —11.4 —4.7 —— —— ——
Q4 —12.0 —5.0 —14.6 —6.2 —— —— —— ——
76:Q1 —11.1 —4.6—14.6 —6.1 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —11.0 —4.5—13.7 —5.7 —— —— —— ——
Q3 —13.8 —5.8—16.5 —6.9 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —12.3 —5.1—15.3 —6.4 —— —— —— ——
77:Q1 —9.9 —4.0—13.1 —5.4 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —12.9 —5.3—16.2 —6.6 —— —— —— ——
Q3 —11.3 —4.6 —14.6 —6.0 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —11.4 —4.6 —14.4 —5.9 —— —— —— ——
78:Q1 —10.9 —4.4—14.0 —5.7 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —12,8 —5.2—16.7 —6.8— —— —— ——
Q3 —14.4 —5.8—18,0 —7.3 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —15.0 —6.1—18.7 —7.6 —— —— —— ——
79tQ1 —17.5 —7.2—21.3 —8.8 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —15.3 —6.3—19.2 —7.8 —— —— —— ——
Q3 —15.0 —6.1—19.0 —7.7 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —16.6 —6.8—20.2 —8.2 —— .—— —— ——
80:Q1 —18.4 —7.6 —22.2 —9.1 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —21.1 —8.8 —24.7 —10.3 —— —— —— ——
Q3 —18.2 —7.5 —22.6 —9.3 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —28.6 —12.3—32.8 —14.0 —— —-- —— ——
81:Q1 —24.0 —10.2—29.4 —12.4 —— —— —— ——
Q2 —26.4 —11.3—31.1 —13.3 —— —— —— ——
Q3 —30.7 —13.4—35.6 —15.5 —— —— —— ——
Q4 —27.2 —11.8—32.5 —14.1 —— —— —— ——
82:Q]. —24.7 —10.7—29.5 —12.7 —0.7 —0.3 1,3 0.6
Q2 —26.1 —11.3—3L.2 —13.6 —2.2 —1.0 0.3 0.1
Q3 —23.7—10.2 —29.2 —12.5 —0.3 —0.1 1.1 0.5
Q4 —22.1 —9.3 —27.2 —11.5 1.3 0.5 4.6 1.9
83:Q1 —17.3 —7.1 —22.0 —9.0 6.2 2.5 8.4 3.5
Q2 —15.8 —6.3—20.4 —8.15.3 2.1 2.3 0.9
Q3 —20.8 —8.4—24.6 —9.9 —1.8 —0.7 —2.7 —1.1
Q4 —21.6 —8.7—25.6 —10.3 —1.3 —0.5 —0.8 —0.3
NE(74—81) —14.3 —6.0—17.5 —7.3
RNSE(74—81) =16.0 6.7 19.3 8.1
ME (82—83)——21.5 —9.0—26.2 —11.00.8 0.0 1.8 0.8
RMSE(82—83) — 21.8 9.2 26.5 11.1 3.1 1.0 3.7 1.6
r
Notes: See the notes in Tables 2 and 6. Restricted versions of equations (6.1) and (6.3)
are estimated from 1959:Q3 through 1973:Q3. Restricted versions of equations






(0.2124) (0.0139) (0.0460) (0.0083) (0.1111)
(6.3') mff =—1.5849—0.Q542.rsd+O.3S2l.y+Q.Q466'c+
(0.0351)(0.0128) (0.0157) (0.0087) (0.13)
(6.7') mff1—0.1091 —0.2228-red—O.0081.rtb+O.O949.y+
(0.3523)(0.1839) (0.0112) (0.0481) (0.0224)




(1,3086) (0.0115) (0.1749) (0.0200) (0.3720)TARLE 9
EXPECTATIONS AND MONEY DEMAND
mff







!ffff'I2L_..b2 1)4 h5 h8 b10 1)1!
(9.1) 59:94—
73:94
-1.212' .0004 .2701* .0439* .2124-.0715 —— -- -- —— --
(.2(29)(.0146) (.0054)(.0535) (.0108) (.1376) (.8181)
'3,2) 74:91—
83:93
-.1511 .1851 —.0140 .0873** .0234 .7964' —1.227" —- -—
, Th5b)(. 1606) (.0097)( . 0484)(.11190)(.0963) (.6849)
1nQ1Fr)_p1 = +h2fsd + b3.rtb + b4•y1 + + b(.(ln(MFFt l)-P) + b7.(p7-p41)
'3.3) 59:94—
73:94
-1.038' .0024 .2392' .0472'.23834* .1969 -- —— -- -— ——
(.1989)(.0138) (.0054)(.0152) (.0094) (.1370) (.2498)
9.41 74:91—
83:93
-.2235—.1820 —.0116 .0971' .0195 .7866*1.029* —— —— —- ——-
I.2(i62) (.1473)(.0086)(.0158) (.11187)(.0931) (.2802)
I )—p =l b,rsd +h3rtb h4 •y +hrW-
+y(1n(MFF)p) +11. ) +b8rtdb10y +b11•w + h17•p +e
19.5) 59:94—
73Q4
1.1 78' -.0366* - .0000 .2640' .0479' .2040 —.8283m1005 .0001 .2673* .0349* —.1099 .99
I .294W) (.14158) (.00(0) .0589)(.1)111)( . 1508)(.9417) (.0331) (.0057) (.1230) (.0135) (.3568)
(1.1.1 74:91—
83:93
-.61 330+ .0204 —.0214 .0993*.0037 .8666*.6961 .0997-.0180 .4613*.0256 -1.730' .83
1.33221 (.1781) (.0143)(.041,5)(.0212)(.1005) (.7352) (.2838) (.0121) (.1933) (.0229) (.1451)
ln(MFFt)_P+i =h0+ b6.l1n(Mrr p-p)+ b8-rsd+hrth + + h1w' + b12'p Ct
(9,7) 59:94—
73:94
.0014 -- -- -- -- 1.001* -- -.0616-.0006 .2362 .0241-.3265 .98






notes in Tables 1 and 6.'I'he superscript "c' denotes the expectation formed from an autoregression estimated
period. Thesuperscript'u' denul estheunanticipatedcomponent,or residual, from the autoregression.










.109l' —— -- -- -— .8729'
(.0689)
-- .0383 -.0054 .4846' .0382*
(.2580) (.0105) (.1618) (.0190)
_l,81S* .82.0105 1.85
(.3780)
over the indicatedNotes: See the notes in Table 1 and 6.
rd =naturallogarithm of StandardPoor's divident-price ratio, quarterly average.










÷b4.(m1 +bs.(p ÷b5y +
b0 b2 b3 b4 b3 b5 p SEE OW
e1
LHS
(10.1)m-.0252 .0308 .0004 -.0173 .9325* -— •34*99 .0044 1.67
(.0276) (.0107) (.0135) (.0117) (.0335) (.12)
(10.2) m1.303k -.0488*-.0137 .0058575* .0197 34* •99 .0039 1.71
(.3340) (.0104) (.0125) (.0979) (.0979) (.1977)(,0683)(.14)
(10.3)rnff- •Q747*-.006S—.0190 .8762* ---- -— .99 .0077 2.31
(.0352) (.0146) (.0176) (.0150) (.0455)
rnff 1.456* •4555* .3237 .99 .0068 1.78
(.4099) (.0145) (.0160) (.0162) (.1212) (.3658)(.0828)
in-.1545 -.0165 -.0769 .9243* -- -- .99 .0083 2.30
(.1407) (.0123) (.1238) (.0145) (.0384)
(10.6) in .1518 —.0125 .0557 .8624* -.2249 —.0485 -- .99 .0084 2.19
(.3786) (.0136) (.1313) (.0158) (.0716) (.2698)(.0652)
(10.7)inff -.1890 .0015 .0881 .9050*-— —- —- .98 .0112 2.47
(.1871) (.0166) (.1624) (.0195) (.0512)
(10.8)mff1.027* -.0002 .1485 .7005* —.0702 -.2257 .99 .0103 2.43

















































































.50 .0110 1.90TABLE ii









amp1e. Coefficient Estimates ______ Statistics
59:Q3— —2
fl_4 ___ b0 B2 b3 14 b5____b7 b8 p R SEE DW
(11.1)nih _2.548* _.1221* —.0197.4149* —.0070 .5510* .0541 -- —— •97.0162 1 8
(.7350) (.0498) (.0120) (.1220) (.0209) (.1283)(.8479)
(11.2) _5•j3Q* _.2271* —.0218 .8298* -.0160 —--.3245 -—.46*.91 .0167 1.8
(.4014)(.0492) (.0173) (.0709) (.0279) (.7860) (.12)
(11.3)nib -1.025 --—.0033.1470 -— .8131*.4546-.0017 —-.78.0198 1.9
(.9551) (.0180) (.1481) (.O974)(1.016) (.0014)
(11.4)nib -1.123 —- .0177 .1190 —— -- —.7981-.0040.82* .07 .0194 1.9
(2.087) (.0215) (.3191) (.7896) (.0032) (.08)
74:Q1—
83:Q4
(11.5) nih_•9433* -.2923 -.0135.2123* .0108 •7579* 1.390* -— —- .80.0175 2.1
(.4551) (.2181) (.0148) (.0888) (.0282) (.1004) (.6331)
(11.6)nih _2.721* -.2646 -.0000•479* .0328 --1.563* -- .82*.24 .0182 1.7
(1.361)(.4155) (.0188) (.2039) (.0358) (.6363) (.09)
(11.7) nib-.8275— .0214 .1089 —- .5292*.6800 _.0037* .90 .0213 1.6
(.9241) (.0181) (.1369) (.1533)(.8898) (.0015)
(11.8)nib -2.680 -- .0234 .3758 -- -— 1.687*_.0087* .68* .54 .01922.0
(1.683) (.0192) (.2507) (.6720)(.0018) (.12)
59:Q3: b0 ÷b2.rsd+ b3.&tbt + b4.AY + b5.Aw + botl + b7A(PtfPt) +Vt
73:Q4
(11.9)Aznh .0032 —.0597.0200 .2678.0104 —.1128 .1570 -— -- - .06.0182 1.9
(.0039)(.0872) (.0189) (.3013) (.0325) (.1527) (.7094)
(11.10)mb -.0061 -- .0075 .2264 —-—.1321—1.205 -- —-—.01.0202 1.9
(.0041) (.0196) (.3268) (.1404) (.7895)
74:QI—
83:Q4
(11.11) Amh-.0016 -.1365 .0056.4761** .0433 —.0119 1.538* —— ——- .15.0193 1.7
(.0036)(.4639) (.0191) (.2755) (.0346) (.1569) (.6390)
(11.12) Ahab_.0113* —- .0151.6212*---.21791.841* ——.21.0202 1.8
(.0038) (.0196) (.3009) (.1640) (.6313)
Notes: See thenotes in Tables 1 and 6.
nih =naturallogarithm of end of quarter household Ml balances (Board of Governors of the Federal
ReserveSystem, Flow of Funds Accounts) divided by the GNP deflator.
nib =naturallogarithm of end of quarter nonfinancial corporate business Ml balances (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Flow of Funds Accounts) divided by the GNP deflator.
t =lineartime trend equal to unity in 1959: Q4, and incremented by one in each subsequent
quarterTABLE 12
POST-SAMPLE STATIC STMTlTATTfl'RtSUUr'. FflPHOUSEHOFftcANT)BUSINFSES
(11.1')4(11.3')(11.2') 4(11.4')(11.5') & (11.7')(11.6') 4(11-C')
Errors Errors Errors Errors
$1972b _____ $1972b 1 $1972b 1 $1972b 1
Period mit nib niff mh mb tiff tilt mb tiff mh nb tiff
74:Q1 1.9 -1.70.1 3.0 -1,50.6 -—---- -—--
Q2-2.6 -1.9 —1.8 -2.2 -1,8 -1.6 -—---- ------
Q3-3.0 —0.2 1.3 —2.3—0.1—0.9 ------ -- -—--
Q4-0.2 -2.7 —1.2 0.0 —2.6 •-0.7 -- —- —- ------
75:QL—3.2 —0.8 —1.7 -1.7 —0.7 —1.0 ------ -- -—--
Q2 1.93.02.0 1.72.71.8 -— —- —- -— -—--
Q3-3.3 -1.6 —2.1-4.0 -2.0 2.5 -- —- —- -—----
Q4—5.5 —1.1 —2.8 -5.7 —1.3 —3.0 —- —- —- -—-- —-
76:Q1—2.00.3 —0.7 —2.80.0 —1.2 ---- —— -—-- ——
Q2—1.3 -0,5 —0.7 -1.0 —0.7 —0.7 —- -—-- ----
Q3—5.5 -1.6 —2.9-5.1 -1.7 —2.9 —- -—-- -—-- —-
Q4—3.9 —0.5 —1.8 -3.7 —0.7 —1.8 —--- -— -—----
77:Q1—1.8 —2.1 —1.6 —2.0 -2.3 —1.8 -- -— -—----
Q2—5.1 —0.8 —2.4 -4.9 —0.9 —2.4 —--- -— -— -—--
Q3—3.3 —1.5 —1.9 —3.3 -1.6 —2.0 —- —- -— -— -—--
Q4-4.70.0 —1.9 —3.90.0 —1.6 —----- -- -— -—
78:Q1—1.0 -2.7 —1.5 —0.7 -2,8 —1.4 -- —- —- -— -— -—
Q2—4.8 —0.7 —2.2 —5.4 -0.8 —2.5 —--- —- -- -— -—
Q3-6.60.4 —2.5 —6.40.5 —2.4 —- —- —- -- -— -—
Q4-4.8 -2.1 —2.8 —5.2 —2.1 —3.0 —- —- —- ------
79:Q1-6.1 —0.9 —2.9 —6.0 -0.8 —2.8 -— —--- ------
Q2-3.7 -1.6 —2.2 —3.3 —1.6 -2.0 -—-- —- ------
Q3-3.3 -1.5 —1.9-3.0 -1.5 —1.9 ---- —- ------
Q4-4.50.1 —1.8 -4.40.1 —1.8 -—-- —- ---- —-
80:Q1-5.6 -2.0 —3.1 -6.1 -2.1 —3.4 -- -—-- -—-- —-
Q2-8.8 -1.4 —4,3 -7.7 -1.3 —3.8 -—-- —- -— -—--
Q3-3.41.1 —0.9 -3.40.9 —1.0 -—---- -— -—--
Q4—12.70.2 —5.4-13.7 -0.1 —5.9 -—--- -— -— -—
81:Q1-7.50.6 —2.9 -9.90.2 —4.1 -—-- —- - —--- -—
Q2-9.7 -0.5 —4.4—10.6 -0.8 —4.9 -—---- —-----
g3—11.9 -2.7 —6.3-13.5 -3.0 —7.2 ------ —-----
Q4-7.3 -3.0 —4.5 -7.7 -3.2 —4,7 ------ —--- -—
82:1-6.0 -1.1 —3.1-5.8 -1.2 —3.0 0.1 -1.8 —0.7 -0.5 -1.7 —0.9
Q2-9.1 -1.5 —4.6—10.0 -1.9. —5.2 —2.4 —2.1 -2.0-2.0 -1.3 -1.4
Q3-8.3 -1.3 —4.1 -8.8 -1.6 —4.5 —1.3 —2.3 —1.6-1.6 -1.8 —1.4
Q4-4.6 -1.4 —2.5 -4.3 -1.8 —2.6 2.1 -2.6 -0.2 3.3 —1.70.7
83:Q1—0.2 -1.2 —0.5 -0.4 -1.6 —0.8 6.7 —2,41.8 7.3 -1.22.5
Q20,0 -0.6 —0.2-1.0 -1.1 -0.8 5.1 —2.0 1.3 3.4 -1.40.8
Q3—6,8 —0.5 —2.9 -7.2 —0.9 —3.3 -1.9 —1.5 —1.4 -2.1 —0.8 —1.2
Q4-7.3 -1.2 —3.4-7.5 -1.6 —3,7 -1.6 -1.9 —1.4 -1.0 -1.3 —0.9
ME(74-81)= —4.S -0.9 —2.3 -4.5 —1.1 —2.3
RMSE(74-81)= 5.61.62.8 5.91.6 2.9
ME(82-83)= -5.3 -1.1 —2.7 -5.6 -1.5 —3.00.8 -2.1 0.0 0.9 -1.4 —0.2
RMSE(82-83) 6.21.23.1 6,51.5 3,4 3.32.1 0.9 3.31.41.4
Notes:See thenotes in Tables2 and 11. Restricted versions of equations (11.1), (11.2).
(11.3) and (11.4) are estimated from 1959:Q3through 1973:Q4. Restricted versions
ofequations (11.5), (11.6), (11.7),and (11.8)are estimated from1974:Q1 through
1981:Q4. The estimatedequstions are:
(11.1') nih =-2.4842-0.1203'rsd-0.0196'rtb +0.4027.y
+0.S549.mhi r
(0.6960)(0.0486) (0.0110) (0.1143) (0.1247)
(11.2') nih =-4.9988-0.2113'rsd—0,0169.rtb+0020'•>'
+O.SO•e1
(0.3614) (0.0510) (0.0171) (0.0615)(0.11)
(11.3')nib =-0.8492+0.1187'>'+0.7962.mb
-0.0016.t
(0.7621) (0.1158) (0.0862) (0.0012)
(11.4' nib=-1.6387+0,1993'>'—0.0042't+O.S2aetl




(0.4251) (0.2261) (0.0151) (0.0850) (0.1155) (0.6521)
(11.6') nih=-2.8474-0.2228'rsd-0.OO96rtb+0.4995->'+l.8227(p1-2
+




(11.7') m1 =-O.178S+O.3961inb +O.8&39(p1-p )- O.0023t
(0.0616) (0.1725) t-1 (0.7487) (0.0008)
(11.8') mb =-1.1863+Ol364•y+ — 0.0049t+
O.SS.e1




See the notes in Tables 1, 6 and 11.




— proportionof other checkable deposits in either aggregate Ml or household Ml balances,
multiplied by 5.25 percent.
TABLE 13







Sample: CoefficientEstimates Swnmary Statistics
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(.7188) (.2207) (.0101)































































































.6076' .5227 .O066' -—.91
(.1194) (.7141) (.0023)
1.822' -.0060 ,98' .18
(.6510) (.0065) (.03)
7493* ,7488",0018 -—.80.0112 2,16
(.0918) (.4077) (.0017)
—- 1.121'—.0057' .86* .39 .0109 1.83
(.3742) (.0029) (.08)
+b •rtbm +b y +b .+b•+b






























































BIAS OF THE ESTIMATED INTEREST ELASTICITY(in percent)
PolicyParameter, A
.
p 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.60 1.00
0.00 0+00 0.00 0.00 000 0.00 0.00 (**)
0.25 0.00 0.54 2.81 5.97 24L11127.27-100.00
0.50 0.00 1.36 7.34 16.38 94.44-350.00-100.00
0.75 0.00 3.57 21.83 56.72-501.64-138.46-100.00
0.90 0.00 10.52 94.61 (*) -140.80-111.18-100.00
0.95 0.00 24.36 (*) -184.37-116.40-105.14-100.00
1.00 (**) -100.00-100.00-100.00-100.00-100.00-100.00
*Denominator equals zero in equation (15).
**soth numerator and denominator equal zero in equation (15).